Post by xyz3700 on Feb 26, 2024 23:23:05 GMT -5
The German antitrust authority banned Facebook from conditioning the use of the social network on the collection of data obtained from other applications, such as WhatsApp and Instagram. It also prohibited the company from conditioning this use on the possibility of combining “Facebook account” information with information collected on websites visited by the user. According to the German antitrust authority, “it was necessary to intervene from a Competition Law perspective because the data protection limits established in the General Data Protection Regulation were clearly exceeded”. In fact, the Bundeskartellamt adds, “in view of Facebook’s dominant position. The decision in this case is constructed from elements that require reflection.
First, the German authority states that it needed to intervene from the perspective of Competition Law, signaling that it is indeed facing a borderline case, in which the application of Antitrust Law is not automatic. It then justifies this intervention with reference to a different rule: the intervention was necessary Chinese Malaysia Phone Number List because data protection regulations (an equivalent of our LGPD) were exceeded. Finally, it completes the justification with an element specific to Competition Law, the existence of a dominant position. What is behind this construction is nothing less than the attempt to demarcate one of the most relevant legal interfaces in the digital economy, that between antitrust and data protection. In Brazil, this interface will gain increasing relevance with the imminent entry into force of the LGPD.
An examination of the German precedent allows the identification of three questions that will also be central in the Brazilian context: (i) can the antitrust authority intervene in cases of possible violation of the right to data protection?; (ii) in these cases, what could be the parameters adopted in an antitrust analysis can this intervention take place even if it is merely exploratory conduct and without there being a clear theory of exclusionary effects? Each of these issues, we will see, leads to a challenge that will have to be faced by the Brazilian antitrust authority, Cade. Regarding the first question, the German antitrust authority justified its jurisdiction based on a set of elements. First, it qualified Facebook's conduct as an abuse of a dominant position under the general clause of section 19(1) of the German Competition Law GWB.
First, the German authority states that it needed to intervene from the perspective of Competition Law, signaling that it is indeed facing a borderline case, in which the application of Antitrust Law is not automatic. It then justifies this intervention with reference to a different rule: the intervention was necessary Chinese Malaysia Phone Number List because data protection regulations (an equivalent of our LGPD) were exceeded. Finally, it completes the justification with an element specific to Competition Law, the existence of a dominant position. What is behind this construction is nothing less than the attempt to demarcate one of the most relevant legal interfaces in the digital economy, that between antitrust and data protection. In Brazil, this interface will gain increasing relevance with the imminent entry into force of the LGPD.
An examination of the German precedent allows the identification of three questions that will also be central in the Brazilian context: (i) can the antitrust authority intervene in cases of possible violation of the right to data protection?; (ii) in these cases, what could be the parameters adopted in an antitrust analysis can this intervention take place even if it is merely exploratory conduct and without there being a clear theory of exclusionary effects? Each of these issues, we will see, leads to a challenge that will have to be faced by the Brazilian antitrust authority, Cade. Regarding the first question, the German antitrust authority justified its jurisdiction based on a set of elements. First, it qualified Facebook's conduct as an abuse of a dominant position under the general clause of section 19(1) of the German Competition Law GWB.